Power in Networks: Considering Castells’ Network Society in Egypt’s January 25th Movement and America’s Occupy Wall Street Movement by Balleria, Marina
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power in Networks: Considering Castells’ Network Society in Egypt’s January 25th 
Movement and America’s Occupy Wall Street Movement 
 
 
 
 
 
Marina Constantina Balleria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Senior Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Bachelor of Arts in International Political Economy 
University of Puget Sound 
 
May 7, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
 
ABSTRACT: Although the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street began on two separate 
continents and with vastly different cultures, and articulated completely disparate 
demands, they share a few fundamental characteristics. First, the aims of both movements 
upset the status-quo by calling for wide-ranging change. Protesting for democracy in the 
Arab world challenged theories of entrenched Arab authoritarianism while Occupy Wall 
Street loudly decried the relentless acceleration of free-market capitalism. Second, both 
employed a decentralized, horizontal form of organization that emphasized inclusive and 
collective decision-making. Finally, social media and other information technologies 
articulated new identities, mobilized participants and coordinated the movements’ actions. 
These three characteristics of calling for transformational change, using a network 
structure and creating a self-conscious identity nearly reflect the social theorist Manuel 
Castells’ definition of a social movement in a network society. Using the Egyptian 
revolution’s January 25th movement (the Jan 25 movement) and Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) as case studies, I argue that Castells’ theory of a network society successfully 
describes how social movements are empowered by the network structure to create social 
change. However, I also argue that Castells’ binary conception of power does not account 
for the relationship between the overarching power structure that shapes each movement. 
Instead, Foucault’s analytics of power clarifies how conditions of domination, in the case 
of Egypt, or subjugation, in the case of OWS, influences the identity created by the 
protest movement. The constructed identity, in turn, determines the role of the individual 
within a greater movement. By using Foucault and Castells in tandem, it is possible to 
better understand both the mechanics of these networked social movements as well as 
how they differ in mounting resistance to their respective political-economic system. 
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Introduction: Understanding the Uprisings of 2011 
“Are you ready for a Tahrir moment?” read an e-mail sent out on July 13, 2011 by the 
Vancouver magazine, Adbusters (Chafkin 2012, 74). This message is said to be the 
catalyst for the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement—a protest movement that 
eventually encompassed the globe, with encampments in over 800 cities and towns. The 
message itself harkens to Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the Egyptian revolution 
that began a six months before and ended President Hosni Mubarak’s twenty-year long 
reign. The e-mail’s author, Adbusters editor Kalle Lasn, said the message was the result 
of conversations between leftists who watched Egyptians use social media to create their 
ideal form of revolution. Lasn explains that the OWS movement was meant to enact “soft 
regime change” in America that targeted both economic and political inequality (Chafkin 
2012, 74). These movements were just two of the hundreds of protest movements that 
overtook the globe in 2011. The media created a grand narrative of the uprisings, 
epitomized by Time magazine naming a faceless, bandana-wearing “The Protester” as the 
“Person of the Year” (Andersen et al. 2011, 54-89). 
 
The Time magazine article emphasized the similarities in the tactics, grievances, 
participants and above all the novelty of the movements while spending little time 
parsing their individual differences. The protests were global, taking place in the Arab 
world, Madrid, Athens, London, Tel Aviv, Mexico, India, Chile, China, Russia and the 
United States. They generally began independently of established political actors, instead 
being lead by young, educated, tech-savvy middle class activists. They generally fought 
against “corruption” and for “democracy”—in the sense of a highly participatory, 
egalitarian and horizontal democracy. This form of democracy was enacted as the 
movements made their decisions collectively, without a leader. Finally, they all used 
social media in varying degrees to coordinate both internally and outwardly to observers. 
The article is meant to be congratulatory; the social movements are presented as a 
revitalization of protest as a successful form of collective action.  
 
Academic analysis would most likely categorize the protests of 2011 as New Social 
Movements (NSM) a term originally described movements that center on claims of 
identity rather than the explicitly economic aims of labor-based movements. These 
identities do not promote a specific policy nor depend on leadership; their purpose is to 
create community around an oppressed or ignored social group of society with hopes of 
creating openings for acceptance and eventual empowerment within the broader social 
structure (Edelman 2001, 285-317). Examples of NSMs include the international 
feminism movement, the American civil rights movements or the anti-nuclear movement. 
A hallmark NSM tactic is prefigurative politics, when the protesters attempt to act out the 
world as they want it to be (Klein 2011). This may be by sitting in the front of a bus or 
creating a commune on a potential nuclear power plant site. In the process, NSMs made 
civil society into a new arena for political contention (Nash 2001, 235). However, the 
protests of 2011 operated as a hybrid of the social movement typologies—the protesters 
created their own versions of democracy or economic justice within the confines of 
public squares. They used the tactics of identity-based NSMs, but applied them to the 
political-economic system, not just to civil society.  
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The identity that protest movements express acts recursively—it is at once an expression 
of individual participants’ internal frustrations but also is determined by the object of 
contention, which is the perceived cause of that discontent. NSMs usually locate the 
object of contention as a cultural oppression but in the protests of 2011 the larger political 
economic systems were contested. The January 25th movement called for the ousting of 
their dictator but wrapped up in that claim was that the Mubarak regimes’ crony 
capitalism had failed to provide for the whole of society. To garner support, the message 
of the revolution was that all Egyptians deserved dignity. For their part, OWS protesters 
expressed their frustration at the influence of the economic elite in American democracy. 
Accordingly, they rallied around the slogan, “We are the 99%,” allowing any person to 
identify with the movement. However, OWS did not articulate any clear demands but 
allowed each individual protester to profess their own meaning of the movement. In order 
to challenge the larger systems of oppression, both movements organized themselves as a 
leaderless network.   
 
A network, broadly defined, is a web-like structure of nodes, or centers, connected to one 
another. Networks can grow without limits; connecting nodes is an endlessly repeating 
process. Compared to hierarchies, there is no leader or base. Networks expand according 
to their own particular logic and it is this logic which determines what nodes are 
members and what relationships are allowed. Social networks are “a collection of actors 
that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, 
lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise 
during the exchange” (Podolny and Page 1997, 59 qtd in Stalder 2006, 177). Absent of an 
authority or hierarchy, the key obstacle for networks is coordinating actions and so strong 
methods of communication are key for successful mobilization.   
 
One social theorist, Manuel Castells, proposed in 1996 that the world is increasingly 
becoming a “network society.” Observing the revolutions in information technology, the 
crisis of industrialism and the proliferation of “freedom-oriented” movements, Castells 
posited that society is shifting from a fundamentally hierarchical structure to the network 
is “the new social morphology of our societies” (Castells 1997, 469). Accordingly, there 
are no longer levels of power, as in a hierarchy. Instead, power is binary; you are either 
excluded or included from a given network. Within this theory, Castells gives social 
movements priority as the sole sources of social change. Castells falls broadly into the 
camp of New Social Movement theorists, describing social movements in a network 
society as embracing new identities and eventually creating structural openings. Castells’ 
theory presciently describes many of the more salient aspects of the social movements of 
2011—their use of technology, hybridization of identity, opposition to systematic 
oppression and of course, use of a network structure. 
 
While Castells framework successfully addresses how that movements form and operate, 
when applied to the case studies it fails to explain why the experience of the individual 
protester differed greatly. Both of the movements operate as networked social movements 
by employing a decentralized organizational structure and articulating an identity that 
challenges the larger system. However, within each movement, there are fundamentally 
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different relations of power. In the Egyptian revolution, the individual is obscured by 
larger calls for dignity and nationalism. In contrast, OWS’s message is individualized so 
that each protester has an equal amount of power. In both cases, protesters are members 
of their respective “networks,” or social movement. However, reducing power to 
membership overlooks the reality differences between individual Egyptian protesters 
were concealed while the distinctions between OWS protesters were exalted. Castells 
does not account for how a movement’s identity can exert its own power—it may totalize 
the masses under one message or may highlight divisions between individual participants. 
 
I use a very circumscribed understanding of Foucault’s analytics of power to argue that 
the differences in each movement’s identities stems from the fundamentally different 
power structures within which they operate. Foucault distinguishes between relations of 
subjugation—when there is a possibility for the one that is controlled to resist—and 
domination—when the subject cannot resist. Egypt is fighting against monolithic 
domination by a repressive regime and thus must create a comprehensive identity to gain 
any freedom. OWS, in comparison, was born in a society of “free subjects,” living in a 
competitive democracy. As such, these subjects, or protesters, are fully empowered to 
create their own identity. Examining these forms of resistance brings attention to the way 
that the overlaying power structure—domination or power—determines the role of the 
individual within the network. By considering a holistic understanding of power it is 
possible to fully interrogate how power may be created using the network form.  
 
Literature Review: New Social Movements and their Theorists 
New Social Movements (NSM) occupy a complex place within the study of social 
movements because they are both a type and a theory of contentious politics. In general, 
social movements are “loose networks of organizations, groups and individuals which 
contest dominant interpretations of events or practices and construct collective identities 
to transform everyday life” (Nash 2001, 235). NSMs take this definition to the extreme 
by organizing protest networks around oppressed1 identities rather than a specific 
political or economic policy. The protests usually have layered messages—the inaugural 
NSM was the anti-Vietnam war protests that decried violence while also criticizing a 
prevailing culture of conformity. The existence of NSMs challenged the Marxist idea that 
class conflict explains most of contentious politics, not cultural issues (Martin 2002, 81; 
Johnston et al. 1994, 7). In response, a new field of scholarship emerged to try to explain 
the advent of identity-based movements. NSMs and the accompanying social theorists 
implicitly feel that expressing a collective identity through a decentralized, leaderless 
movement can create lasting change. As Melucci (1985) puts it, “I am convinced…that 
these poor, disenchanted forms of action are the seeds of qualitative change in 
contemporary collective action.” (809-810 qtd in Martin 2002, 76). NSMs have no 
specific orientation, they may fall anywhere on the political spectrum and can be global, 
national or local, or operate simultaneously on each of these parameters. Their most 
distinguishing features are their network structure and focus on identity and culture. 
 
                                                        
1
 In general, when I mention “oppression” I am not claiming it is a fact, instead I’m 
indicating that the group in question perceives themselves to be oppressed. 
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The structure of NSMs purposefully challenges any authority, be it within or outside of 
the movement. In social movement terminology they are decentralized, horizontal and 
fluid. In theory, they do not rely on a leader but make decisions collectively, either 
informally or through participatory debate. This is in sharp contrast to the “Leninist” 
model of working-class movements, which is inspired by Lenin’s call for professional 
revolutionaries to lead the Russian revolution (Johnston et al. 1994, 8). Pichardo explains 
that the non-rigid, anti-bureaucratic structure is intentional because NSMs “are more 
responsive to the needs of the individuals….Motivated by the lessons of the past, they 
hope to avoid becoming co-opted or deradicalized” (Pichardo 1997, 416). NSMs are 
consciously constructed to empower individuals while evading opposition to ensure their 
survival. 
 
Beyond the decentralized structure, NSMs are distinguished by their use of identity to 
change the social structure. There is some debate about whether a movement can be 
categorized as a NSM if it goes beyond asserting and identity to demand political and/or 
economic change. Theorists such as Melucci and Touraine define NSMs as only existing 
within civil society and not engaging with established economic or political actors (Nash 
2001, 235). Nash (2001) argues that this is an unnecessary limitation because NSMs are 
ultimately distinguished by their main aim to open society up to new identities, which 
may be through the articulation of an oppressed identity or by the promotion of a certain 
policy. Regardless of the end goal, these identities focus on symbolic issues and attempt 
to assert autonomy rather than maximize power (Johnston et al. 1994, 7; Buechler 1995, 
442; Martin 2002, 81). The Jan 25 movement and OWS both express identities that were 
not recognized in dominant society—the democratic Egyptian and the disenfranchised 
American—to challenge their respective systems. Through the articulation of these 
identities they aim to change in the larger political economic structure, making them a 
hybridization of an identity-based movement that goes beyond the cultural realm.  
 
NSM theorists share the fundamental assumption that society has become “post-industrial” 
or an “information society,” in which economic production, enabled by new technology, 
shifts to the production of knowledge. Accordingly, social movements move from 
material claims to identity-based claims as Melucci (1989) explains, “[t]he freedom to 
have which characterized…industrial society has been replaced by the freedom to be” 
(qtd in Johnston et al. 1994, 9). NSM theorists are a diverse body of scholars from a 
range of backgrounds, including Jurgen Habermäs, Alberto Melucci, Alaine Touraine and, 
of course, Manuel Castells. The theorists create complementary, yet divergent predictions 
of how technology, identity, information and society become alternating repressive or 
empowering forces in this new epoch.  
 
I will summarize the work of Melucci and Touraine—who both proposed contrastive 
methods of studying social movements—to contextualize Castells’ own theory of the 
information age. Touraine believes that classes will no longer struggle over the 
production of goods but instead over the production of culture, which he calls 
“historicity”—the capacity of society to create and recreate itself (Foweraker, 1995, 12). 
He developed a method of “Sociological Intervention,” which aimed to discover the 
higher meaning of a social movement within society. Melucci, on the other hand, 
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critiques Touraine for attempting to essentialize social movements, believing they could 
better be studied as changing social constructs. However, Melucci has a similar 
conception of contemporary society. He specifically sees NSMs as challenging the 
“technoscientific apparatus, agencies of information and communication, and the 
decision-making centers that determine policies wield their power over these domains,” 
by manipulating information and communication production to construct their own social 
meanings (Melucci 1994, 101). For Melucci, expanding public discourse, deploying new 
cultural symbols and integrating subversive identities are acts of protest that challenge the 
normative information disseminated through mass media or national propaganda. While 
Touraine and Melucci use different methodologies, they both create worlds in which 
social movements defend culture through identity creation in the face of the totalizing 
and dominating forces of post-industrial society.  
 
Critics of NSM theorists level three main claims against the movements and their 
theory—first, the definition of NSM as a typology is vague; second, society has not 
changed substantially enough to merit being deemed a new stage of society; and third, the 
movements themselves are not indicative of the changes in society (Pichardo 1997; 
Calhoun 1994; Nash 2001; Martin 2002). The third point is most pertinent because it puts 
NSMs into a broader context of social movement history while continuing to focus upon 
the role of identity. Calhoun (1994) argues that NSMs are actually a continuation of 
identity politics (Calhoun 1994, 9-36). He finds that social movements from centuries ago, 
such as the women’s rights movement are equally as concerned with identity-creation as 
are NSMs. To Calhoun (1994), the emphasis on grandiose social theory has reduced the 
relationship between identity and society into “the individual as a locus of interior 
feelings that need to be expressed in identity claims and society as the exterior source of 
pressures for conformity” (23). In comparison to identity politics, NSM theories ignore 
the individuals’ agency to affect society and the various roles that society plays beyond 
an enforcer of orthodoxy. Adding to this idea, Martin (2002) contends that in many 
contemporary movements, especially those in the global south, “traditional” issues persist 
such as material redistribution and citizens rights (81-82). NSMs as a typology may 
simply be a new phrase for identity politics, which disregards other contemporary 
movements that exist outside of the western world. 
 
NSM theory assembles key features for understanding the Jan 25 movement and OWS by 
highlighting the importance of structure and identity within the movements. Additionally, 
Melucci and Touraine highlight the various ways of interpreting identity-based social 
movements within contemporary society. OWS and The Jan 25 movement could both be 
seen as creating new forms of “being” within oppressive societies that increasingly traffic 
in information as the basis of production. However, as the critiques of social movement 
theory make clear, these movements should not be considered unprecedented in human 
history. Therefore, I am framing my case studies using the work of Manuel Castells’ who 
believes identity politics are an enduring part of all politics (Stadler 2006, 77). Castells 
claims that contemporary society breaks with the past because the fundamental structure 
of society has moved to being a network (Stalder 2006, 5). This argument is more 
compelling to discuss OWS and the Jan 25 movement because it focuses on form rather 
than differing types of conflict to provide an understanding of the two movements. I will 
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look at how the Jan 25 movement and OWS have structured their movements similarly 
yet their exact forms have been influenced by differing power structures.  
 
Manuel Castells and the Network Society 
Castells’ theory of the network society comes from his trilogy The Information Age: 
Economy, Society and Culture, which is comprised of The Rise of the Network Society 
(1996), The Power of Identity (1997), and End of Millenium (1998), totaling over 1,200 
pages. It is further developed in his subsequent works, such as Communication Power 
(2009), as well as several essays and compilations on the subject. He draws mainly on 
tangible events saying, “I do not consider myself a theorist. I am an empirical 
sociologist…who tries to makes sense of observations with whichever theoretical tools 
are available and shift into making new ones when I feel the need” (Roberts 1999, 33-39). 
According to Castells, the network society arises from three “accidental coincidences:” 
the information technology revolution, the crisis of industrialism in both Western 
capitalism and Soviet statism and finally the emergence of “freedom oriented” social 
movements (Stadler 2006, 3).  
 
Castells sees the network as the basis for a new social “logic” that operates using power 
relations of exclusion and inclusion.  
“The inclusion/exclusion in networks, and the architecture of relationships between 
networks, enacted by light-speed operating information technologies, configurate 
dominant process and functions in our society…Switches connecting the networks…are 
the privileged instruments of power. Thus the switchers are the power holders….” (1996, 
470-71).  
Power is an on and off switch. Those included in networks become the power-holders 
who guard access while others are disenfranchised. Nodes that efficiently specialize 
according to the logic of the network become greater power holders through a feedback 
loop (Castells 1997, 374). This can happen on multiple levels—Hong Kong has become a 
global financial center which is strengthened as its currency becomes one of the most 
highly traded in the world; the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN, attracts good researchers 
and thus continues to innovate, thereby further increasing its prestige; Damien Hirst, the 
contemporary artist, becomes famous through media coverage, in turn his prices rise, 
garnering him more fame. The excluded, however, have little opportunity to gain 
entrance into a network. A computer-illiterate man cannot enter into the Hong Kong 
financial system; nor can another artist imitate Hirst and expect the same success. Hong 
Kong finances requires technological saavy while the contemporary art world requires an 
imprecise mix of irony, creativity and bravado. However, it must be noted that Hong 
Kong, the Mayo Clinic and Damien Hirst do not hold any intrinsic power. Their power is 
derived from their respective network’s logic, be it that of the global financial system, the 
field of medical research or the contemporary art world. In exclusionary/inclusionary 
power relationships, 2 the logic of the network acts as a dominating force by determining 
membership and therefore power.  
 
Power is ever-present yet immaterial in a network society, but there remains the 
possibility of social change through alternate networks. Castells (1997) concurs 
                                                        
2
 This phrase will be shortened to in/ex power throughout the remainder of the paper. 
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with the NSM idea that identity is a form of power but maps it onto the network, 
saying new power relations depend on “the capacity to control global instrumental 
networks on the basis of specific identities” (305), and goes on to claim power is 
“in people’s minds” (359). However, the network does not simply dominate, 
Castells (1997) believes that “following the old law of social evolution, resistance 
confronts domination, empowerment reacts against powerlessness, and alternative 
projects challenge the logic embedded in the new global order” (69). Power is 
deployed through identity, but there is always the possibility for new identities to 
create alternative networks of power, also known as social movements. This logic 
comes to bear as Castells’ applies his theory the tangible realms of production, 
experience and power, which corresponds with economics, society and politics, 
respectively.  
 
The economy in a network society is increasingly informational, global and 
composed of networks, which makes it ever more uncontrollable and dynamic. 
The economy itself is still distinctly capitalistic, however firms now compete to 
process and create knowledge more efficiently instead of material items. 
Information is a unique economic resource. It is liberated from scarcity because it 
is capable of endlessly creating new products with the same source material. 
Castells calls this shift “informationalism,” and with it the economy is best 
adapted to a flexible and decentralized network that enables flows of information. 
Castells cites the dominance of global financial markets, multinational 
corporations and the proliferation of fragmented, loosely connected firms as the 
vanguard of the networked economy (Crozier 2002, 3). OWS and the Jan 25 
movement both occurred in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, 
arguably the result of the volatility of a networked economy. This crisis’ causes 
are still debatable, but the cascade of financial collapses across the globe 
highlighted the interconnectedness and fragility of the world’s economic centers. 
The ensuing debt crisis demonstrated how much of the financial system is bound 
up in deals that only exist in the ether of information technology. Castells’ theory 
of a networked economy is well suited to explain the financial collapse and 
economic uncertainty that surround OWS and the Jan 25 movement.  
 
In the realm of politics, Castells imagines the state as the center of power, however, its 
importance is increasingly contested in a network society creating an overall crisis of 
political institutions. Castells (2000) uses a Weberian concept of power in which the state 
maintains and enforces domination through legitimatization (8). However, the nation-
state is losing importance as borders become increasingly permeable for economic and 
social actors. Nation-states will be demoted from sovereign powers to merely strategic 
actors, and become network states (Stalder 2006). Castells only gives a vague definition 
of a network state as being “made out of a complex web of power-sharing, and negotiated 
decision-making between international, multinational, national, regional, local and 
nongovernmental, political institutions” (Castells 2000, 693-699). In domestic politics, 
most traditional power-holders are almost irrelevant to citizens, including institutions, 
social organizations, economic actors and symbolic controllers such as the church or 
corporate media (Castells, 1997, 359). Egypt and the United States both have power that 
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extends beyond their borders, but are also members of international organizations that, 
theoretically, subsume their sovereignty. The protesters of OWS and the Jan 25 
movement focused on challenging their domestic political institutions, a result of a 
networked politics increasingly based upon relationship between actors rather than a 
preordained hierarchy.  
 
Culture becomes similarly rearranged and increasingly dependent on “electronically-
based communication” creating “real virtuality.” Castells (1997) describes “real virtuality” 
as “a system in which reality itself (that is, people’s material/symbolic existence) is 
entirely captured, fully immersed in a virtual image setting…in which appearances are 
not just on the screen through which experience is communicated, but they become the 
experience” (Castells, 373). In real virtuality—as opposed to virtual reality—the human 
experience plays out entirely in worlds that exist in communication mediums, such as 
social networking, image sharing websites or Internet dating, all of which postdate 
Castells’ theory. As institutions crumble, the creation of identity falls to the individual as 
a way to form communities in a cacophonic society (Castells 1996, 3-4). OWS and the 
Jan 25 movement both first articulated their identity in the real virtuality of Facebook 
pages, e-mails and other social media, arenas that later acted as the catalyst of 
mobilization. OWS and the Jan 25 movement succeeded in translating identities 
expressed in “real vituality” into physical, sustained protests. 
 
When these identities are aggregated into social movements they are, according to 
Castells, the only basis for social change in a network society. Castells defines social 
movements as “purposive collective action whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, 
transform values and institutions of society” (2004 [1997], 3) Felix Stadler (2006) a 
specialist on Manuel Castells, gives a concise summary of social movements in a network 
society (77-81). First, social movements are self-conscious, a marker meant to 
differentiate them from other forms of collective action. Their meaning is created through 
their actions but that meaning may only be understandable to their members, or may be 
changed depending on the audience. Second, they act autonomously. They are 
constrained by their surroundings but their internal logic and values are not derived from 
other forces. Third, the success or failure of a social movement is inconsequential, their 
eventual dissipation or cooptation is all but inevitable. Instead, their very existence and 
articulation of an oppositional identity is sufficient to affect cultural values. Fourth, they 
articulate oppositional identities; there is no such thing as a dominant social movement. 
These characteristics at once place social movements in opposition to dominant networks 
of power, but by creating an alternate, independent network they can create social change. 
 
Social movements are empowered by the network structure. As Castells (1997) says, “the 
main agency detected in our journey across the lands inhabited by social movements, it is 
a networking, decentered form of organization and intervention, characteristic of new 
social movements mirroring and counter-acting, the networking logic of domination in 
the informational society (362). Castells is harkening to the NSM typology of a 
decentralized structure, but justifies the structure as mirroring societal level changes. 
Furthermore, the meaning of a particular movement can change depending on context, 
giving it broader power to attract a wide-range of members. As information diffusion 
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becomes increasingly accessible, more social movements may come from marginalized 
sectors of society. The Jan 25 movement and OWS are proof-positive that the symptoms 
of a network society—an unstable political and economic environment and a culture of 
real virtuality—can lead to uprisings of the dispossessed.  
 
Castells uses the quasi-mystical phrases “space of flows” and “timeless time” to describe 
the shifts in the fundamental logic of society. Traditionally, space is the physical place 
where social practices occur. However, aided by new technologies, these social practices 
take place even if the participants are separated by distance. This may be a conversation 
between family members in different countries through Skype, a business deal conducted 
by a transnational corporation or an anti-globalization activist network coordinating on 
the Internet. In each of these cases, the participants are acting out social practices and 
even occupying the same “time” but not the same place. The character of time has 
evolved to be, in the words of Bromley “time without socially meaningful ordered 
sequence and subject to individually random perturbations” (Bromley 1999, 6-17). This 
new ordering of space and time, however, still operates according to the in/ex power of 
the network. 
 
The space of flows is controlled by elites while the majority of the population continues 
to be kept in a space of places exacerbating the division between the members of a 
network and the excluded. Castells and Henderson (1986) summarize this experience 
with the phrase: “contradiction between placeless power and powerless places” (7, qtd in 
Stalder 2006, 150). The OWS claim that “We are the 99%” was pointed at the elites that 
have a disproportionate amount of power. The Jan 25 movement, meanwhile challenged 
the cronies of Mubarak that effectively ruled Egypt’s supposedly democratic society. 
However, as the two movements related with their international participants, they were 
similarly entering into an alternate “space of flows” and operating within a timeless time. 
“Space of flows” and “timeless time” Castells demonstrate the full extent of a network 
society and gives context to the in/ex power of the network society.  
 
Critiques of Castells: Towards an Understanding of Power 
Castells’ wide-ranging theory has an extensive range of critics that take issue with 
his imprecise theories and definitions, tendency towards technological 
determinism and/or with the very notion that we have entered a new society 
(Nyíri 2006; Bromley 1999; Webster 1997). There are other proponents of the 
network society, most notably Jans van Dijk, author of The Network Society 
(1999), who calls Castells’ iteration “one-dimensional” because it ignores 
individual agency defines “networks” so broadly that they become meaningless 
(van Dijk 1999, 143). Many of these criticisms are valid, however they are aimed 
at the network society as a plausible way to predict or explain contemporary 
society. As has been discussed, Castells’ description of a “networked” society, 
politics and economy is useful in describing the world in 2011. In order to apply a 
theory to different case studies, there must be a certain level of imprecision to 
allow for interpretation.  
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When considering social movements in a network society, however, I find that 
in/ex power myopically focusing on membership in a network, overlooking the 
role of individual participants and the greater political context. Kate Nash, a 
political sociologist, proposes that a form of “cultural politics” relying upon 
Foucault’s analytics of power should be applied to Castells’ network society. 
Nash (2001) argues that Castells misrepresents his own notion of power by stating 
that power through identity is enacted in people’s minds (237). Rather, Castells 
uses examples that do not locate power in thoughts but in following cultural codes 
during social interactions. Nash explains “[p]ower must be seen, then, as 
embedded in the practices which, reproduced over time and space, constitute the 
material social structures of The Information Age” (238). Power does not follow a 
binary of whether an individual is a member in a network or not. Instead, 
membership is created through social practice by exercising skills to warrant 
inclusion but also by being conscious of his or her membership. This echoes 
Foucault’s (1982) conception that a “subject”—an individual in a power 
relationship—is twofold, “subject to someone else’s control and dependence, and 
tied to his own identity by a conscience and self-knowledge” (781).  Foucault 
brings together both the individual, as a “subject” into a more holistic 
understanding of power relations.  
 
The type of subject, however, depends upon whether the individual is in a relation of 
power or a relation of domination. As Nash explains “free subjects” exist in a specific 
form of power relations “where there is the possibility of resistance, where subjects are 
not fully determined but may realize different possibilities from the range with which 
they are faced, that is meaningful to think of power.” (240). In a relation of subjugation, 
the oppressed may become the oppressor. In a relation of domination, however, there is 
little possibility of resistance. Nash draws on Hindess’ understanding of Foucault’s 
domination as a “particular structure or power in which antagonisms are consolidated in 
hierarchical and stable relations” (240). In sum, an individual may “subjugated” but 
capable of resistance while a dominated individual has no chance of becoming the 
dominator.  
 
However, domination is not necessarily forever. Foucault (1982) connects the type of 
power relation with forms of successful resistance. He uses the phrase “relations of 
strategy” to describe both how power is exerted but also how resistance can be created. 
Again, there is a distinction in the sort of resistance possible under “subjugation” and 
“domination.” Combating domination, like domination itself, “manifests in a massive, 
universalizing form, at the level of the whole social body….” (795). In order to 
successfully resist domination, the entire polity must unite to confront it. In contrast, 
subjugation does not specify a reciprocal strategy but “[e]very power relationship implies, 
at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle, in which the two forces are not super-imposed, 
do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become confused” (794). In terms of 
social movements, resistance may take on any variation of identity if it is acting against 
subjugation. However, if a movement is trying to defy domination, it must mobilize a 
massive body of resistance.  
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The division between these two terms—domination and power—becomes important as I 
examine the case studies. The identity articulated by each social movement is directly in 
response to the object of contention or, in Foucault’s terms, the relation of power. 
Through an analysis of the two movements in a network society, I find that the individual 
agency within each movement differs greatly depending upon whether the participants 
are dominated or free subjects. This relationship is not possible to explain using Castells’ 
binary understanding of power as simply inclusionary or exclusionary. 
 
Questions of Investigation 
Drawing from Castells’ own empirical methodology as well as his definition of a 
social movement, I have identified key questions to interrogate how the Jan 25 
movement and OWS operate as networked social movements.  
 
What structural openings allowed these movements to exist? 
Structural openings are the opportunities available in politics, economics or in culture 
that enable or allow a social movement to surface. Injustice does not always create a 
protest. There is no single “opening” or grievance that creates a protest movement, the 
point of examining the political, social and economic ecology as a whole is to avoid easy 
causality. Clearly, there must be an “object of contention” which impels a movement to 
be created, which may be any form of injustice. In these particular case studies, it is 
important to note both oppose the political-economic system, forming the overall power 
structure. The object of contention of a movement is not always the relations of power 
but in these cases they are one and the same. By recognizing the spaces and grievances 
that allow a movement to emerge, the next step is to understand that movements are self-
conscious creations.  
 
What identity do these movements articulate? What does it oppose?  
This question is rooted in Castells’ particular definition of a social movement as creating 
social change by expressing new identities. The identity, however, must be in opposition 
to something—be it a tax on the wealthy, bigotry against racial groups or a social 
rejection of types of sexuality. Identity is not simply an assertion of “who we are,” it is an 
exercise in locating a movement in relation to the rest of society. An “object of 
contention,” can be opposed with identities that are militant, nonviolent, tolerant or 
exclusive and so forth. In my understanding, oppositional identity encompasses both 
what the movement is protesting and also how it carries out that protest. 
 
How does the movement act as a network? 
Drawing upon previous definitions of a network as being horizontal and leaderless, I will 
look at how each movement communicated within itself and to the outside world. The 
decision-making process indicates how power flows through the movement. In addition, I 
will examine how different layers interact, including international, nation, local, political 
and nonpolitical networks, to create a protest. The structure of the movement is also a 
space to understand the role of technology in coordinating with others.  
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Finally, as I look at each of these movements I will focus on their beginnings. As Castells 
says, along with other NSMs theorists, the most important act of a social movement is to 
exist, not whether the movement is able to achieve its stated demands. 
 
Case Study: The Egyptian Revolution 
The protests of 2011 began in December of 2010, when a fruit vender, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, set himself on fire causing protests to erupt across Tunisia. The ensuing 
uprisings of the Arab Spring spread geographically from North Africa’s Atlantic Coast to 
the Arabian Peninsula, affecting monarchies and republics alike with protest in both rural 
and urban areas. It took the entire world by surprise because the majority of the Arab 
world has been under some form of authoritarianism despite popular support for 
democracy (Gause 2011, 82; Brumberg 2008, 56). Egypt’s revolution was one of the 
most spectacular of the Arab Spring, and arguably the most successful; Tahrir Square 
became shorthand for populist, decentralized uprisings capable of toppling dictators. The 
Egyptian revolution and the subsequent global uprisings followed a similar model of 
organizing through Twitter, Facebook and other social media however they were met 
with varying degrees of oppression from regimes. Beginning with Egypt as a case study 
is a starting point to consider the evolution of the protests of 2011. 
 
Openings in a Liberalized Autocracy 
One of the foremost scholars on democracy in the Arab world, David Brumberg, 
rationalizes the durability of repressive states in the Arab world as “liberalized autocracy.” 
He describes this regime as “a set of interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, 
social, and geostrategic factors has created an adaptable ecology of repression, control, 
and partial openness.” (Brumberg 2002, 56). Liberalized autocracies create small 
allowances to their population to express their grievances, such as symbolic protests or 
publishing a dissident newspaper. If the opposition movement oversteps their bounds, the 
regimes temporarily restricts freedom as a reminds of the regime’s ultimate power. 
Eventually, however, the regime will make some concessions again, beginning the cycle 
anew. However, in the winter of 2011, there were structural openings outside of the 
regime’s control that contributed to the emergence of the Jan 25 movement.  
 
The most popular explanation for the Egyptian revolution is increasing Internet access. 
Wael Ghonim, a Google executive that created what became the Jan 25 movement’s 
primary Facebook page is quoted saying “If you want to free a society, just give them 
Internet access” (Khamis and Vaugh 2011, 1). The basic premise is that social media and 
other Internet-based technology allowed protesters to circumvent oppressive the regimes 
and coordinate to overthrow the dictators. However this theory is partially debunked by 
the fact that there is no relation between Internet density and the occurrence of revolts in 
the Middle East (Saletan 2011). In Egypt in particular, only 5% of the nation’s 85 million 
citizens use Facebook (Srinivasan, 2011). These statistics tell us that while the Internet 
was not necessarily a causal factor, it enabled a more revolutionary segment of the 
population. Instead, there were economic, political and demographic realities that 
impelled Egyptians, and Arabs across the world to protest against injustices.  
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In 2011, the Arab world was in the midst of a “youth bulge,” meaning a high proportion 
of the population was between 15 and 29 years old. Political scientists and demographers 
report that the tipping point is when youth make up 35% and 40% of the overall 
population (Hvistendahl 2011, 552-554) The theory gained legitimacy after the Arab 
Spring—Egypt’s youth bulge was 43%, Tunisia and Bahrain had 38% and Yemen’s was 
at 53%, according to United Nation’s estimates for 2010 (Hvistendahl 2011, 552). Youth, 
especially those who are educated, are more likely to engage in political protest for many 
reasons—they have less to lose and more to gain and they have been informed by 
democratic, liberal ideas through their education (Cottle, 2011, 650).  
 
In addition, a vast majority of these young people were unemployed. The global 
economic crisis further exacerbated the economic hardship in the Arab world 
(Bajrektarevic 2011, 104). Two days before the Egyptian protests began the International 
Monetary Fund warned that Egypt’s 25% youth unemployment rate could lead to civil 
unrest (Talley 2011). Across the Arab world, Gause (2011) finds that countries engaged 
in Washington-consensus economic reforms suffered from high levels of inequality and 
extensive crony capitalism (84). This stunted both the regime’s legitimacy but also their 
ability to control protests. By following these policies, Egypt became included in the 
network of liberalized economies, even though the total population did not significantly 
benefit. As Castells explains, membership in a network creates power, so the regime 
prioritized being included with the liberalizing superpowers over the material wellbeing 
of its citizens. In the process, it reinforced a group of elites that benefited from these 
policies, creating their own domestic power networks.  
 
Beyond economic strains on the population, Egyptians had been increasingly exposed to 
the ideal of democracy through the media, western, Arab and Internet-based. Western 
entertainment has infiltrated the globe, which Cottle (2011) argues has “contributed to the 
globalization of values and tenets of economic liberalism and liberal democracy” (650).  
Many of the people of the Arab world support democracy as a political system; Gause 
(2011) observes that when given real election choices there is a high voter turnout (82).  
In addition to western-generated media, Al-Jazeera, the Qatari news network, broadcast 
news of the revolutions across the Arab world and the globe. Beyond mass media, 
Khamis and Vaughn (2011) argue that the Internet is one of the most important spaces in 
which public opinion trends and public spheres are both shaped and expressed in modern 
Arab societies (5). Bayat (2011) finds that the demographic group that is most active on 
the Internet—mainly youth but also those who are individualistic and aligned with values 
of modernity—are most likely to engage in political protest. Through exposure to 
democracy as a way of life that on the screen, or in real virtuality, its potency as a symbol 
moves from a foreign concept to a familiar form of government. Put plainly, Egyptians 
knew what democracy looked like and knew they did not have it.  
 
For Middle Eastern scholars, the Arab Spring is puzzling because it debunked the theory 
of entrenched Arab authoritarianism. Brumberg’s notion of liberalized autocracy is one 
product of this scholarship. Beyond Orientalist ideas that autocracy is endemic to Arab 
culture, the prevailing justification is that an axis of resource wealth, a strong military 
security complex and an imposed lack of civil society allow regimes to maintain their 
 16
power. Gause (2011) contends that the Arab Spring mobilized these supposedly static 
relationship into a dynamic one, and also introduces the importance of a pan-Arab 
identity. In Egypt, as it became clear that a large part of the population were sympathetic 
to the protesters, the military broke their allegiance with Mubarak’s regime. Furthermore, 
the regime did not have enough funds to placate the masses with government handouts. 
In Gauses’ estimation, Mubarak’s regime failed to account for the economic and political 
injustices and the well-institutionalized military filled the power vacuum. Essentially, 
Gause is describing a crisis of institutions, a hallmark of Castells’ network society. The 
networks of elites that ruled Egypt began to split apart, creating an opportunity for the 
protesters. 
 
In contrast to other Arab countries, Egypt had enjoyed a relatively high level of freedom 
of expression including a loose group of oppositional parties (Anderson 2011, 7). 
Individually these parties failed to garner sufficient support to challenge the regime but 
collectively they contributed their organizing capabilities to the movement. These include 
the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamist political party, the Kefaya (Enough) 
movement, which began with state-sanction protests against the Palestine and Iraq 
occupations, Ayman Nour’s political party, founded on liberal democratic principles and 
concerns about human rights, as well as the April 6th movement, which was first 
concerned with labor rights (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 8). Khamis and Vaughn (2011) 
cite Muslim Brotherhood member saying that the existing political groups failed to create 
real change because they had not achieved public mobilization on a mass scale (14). 
Brumberg cynically observes that these parties were purposefully allowed because they 
create a dissonance between factions while the regime can retain the appearance of 
stability and openness (2002, 61). However, these activists formed a fledgling alternative 
network to challenge the regime.  
 
The structural openings that led to the Egyptian revolution are indicative of the “space of 
flows” through which power travels in a network society.  While the elites have 
“placeless power,” traditional activists occupied “powerless places.”  Within the Egyptian 
elites, power was accumulated based upon allegiance to the regime as well as the 
promotion of Washington-consensus style economic policy. At the grassroots level, 
however, networks were beginning to form between a segment of the youth population 
that shared a common profile: unemployed, educated and with liberal values. Within this 
movement, the major power holders were the technology-savvy who were able to express 
themselves through social media. The activists accumulated their own power in the realm 
of real virtuality by disseminating images of a democratic Egypt and creating a space for 
free discourse. However, while the Egyptian protesters were able to gain power through 
the Internet, it must be remembered that this was their only method of expressing their 
discontent. The political, economic and civil society realms were entirely dominated by 
the regime through a liberalized autocracy. In order to translate the discontent that existed 
in the virtual world into physical protest, activists had to coalesce into an oppositional 
identity. 
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Creating an Oppositional Identity 
As the story goes, the Egyptian Revolution was organized through a Facebook page 
called “Kullena Khaled Said” or “We Are All Khaled Said” (Vargas 2012, Khamis and 
Vaughn 2011). Khaled Said was a young Egyptian man who was brutally beaten and 
killed by Egyptian police officers. The Facebook page was created by Wael Ghomin on 
June 8, 2010 who felt “Khaled Said was a young man just like me, and what happened to 
him could have happened to me…All young Egyptians had long been oppressed, 
enjoying no rights in our own homeland” (Vargas 2012) In this statement, Ghomin 
encapsulates the Egyptian revolution’s primary identity of dignity for all. The Egyptian 
revolution utilized sweeping language that pointed to a common enemy rather than 
distinguishing between members. The first protest on the 25 of January co-opted 
“Celebrating Egyptian Police Day — January 25” to “January 25: Revolution Against 
Torture, Poverty, Corruption and Unemployment.” As Ghomin, explains, “We needed to 
have everyone join forces: workers, human rights activists, government employees and 
others who had grown tired of the regime’s policies…If the invitation to take to the 
streets had been based solely on human rights, then only a certain segment of Egyptian 
society would have participated” (2012). Furthermore, “dignity”—a rallying point echoed 
throughout the Arab world—does is not part of an ideology but is a state of being 
tantamount to a human right. The movement implicates the government in violating this 
right and so creates an identity that collectively orients its members against Mubarak’s 
regime.  
 
Dignity moved from being values to an identity, but the Egyptian revolution also used a 
preexisting identity—Egyptian nationalism. Egyptian flags were present at every rally 
and protestors sang the national anthem. This was a conscious decision; the “We are all 
Khaled Said” Facebook page instructed: “Egyptian flags only, no political emblems, no 
violence” (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 15). The national identity served as a powerful way 
to obscure other factions that may be divisive within the movement such as Islamist 
movements or more radical political activists. Nationalism as a touchpoint made the 
revolution seem like a reclaiming of Egyptian identity through revolution, rather than 
revolt being a violent break with the past.  
 
The intertwined identities of nationalism and dignity are present in the stated demands of 
the protesters, which are similarly vague and all-encompassing. Before the January 25th 
protest, a pamphlet was circulated that gave advice on both what the group was protesting 
for and how to protest. The demands named are uncontroversial: “1. The downfall of the 
regime of Hosni Mubarak and his ministers, 2. The cessation of Emergency Law 3. 
Freedom 4. Justice 5. The formation of a new, non-military government with the interests 
of the Egyptian people at heart. 6. The constructive administration of all of Egypt’s 
resources” (Madrigal 2011). Interestingly, these demands speak using a collective “we” 
that is only specified as “the Egyptian people”. The authors of demands are anonymous, 
partially out of safety but also because the Jan 25 movement did not have any 
intentionally appointed leaders, only “accidental leaders”. Khamis and Vaughn (2011) 
argue that the lack of the leaders “is further evidence that it was a genuine express of the 
public’s will” (10). A less sanguine reading indicates that these identities only operated to 
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unite the Egyptian citizens together. Intentionally, the identity of the Jan 25 movement 
was a collective yet singular identity that did not recognize any individuals within the 
movement. 
 
The identity of a united Egypt against Mubarak was also broadcast to an international 
audience. Castells argues that social movements are capable of articulating many 
different meanings on various levels. The Jan 25 movement adopted the global image of 
a protester. The aforementioned pamphlet also provided instruction about proper protest 
clothing—including a scarf for tear gas and a rose for peace—as well as the instructions 
to always use “a positive message.” The tactics the movement used clearly mirror and 
draw from the tactics of former revolutionaries. This image was perpetuated throughout 
the protests as activists tweeted updates in English, hoping to attract international 
sympathy to their cause. The protesters not only created an identity to mobilize 
supporters at home, but they also engaged in the culture of real virtuality by collectively 
representing the movement to an international audience. 
 
The Jan 25 movement employed was a powerful, yet simple identity that the oppressed 
Egyptian people deserved dignity, and was oppositional in only one direction—against 
Mubarak. It even incorporated political parties that follow distinct, sometimes 
incompatible ideologies. It speaks to the power of the anti-Mubarak identity that they 
joined together. There was an order of magnitude between the demands and the identity 
being raised. The Egyptian revolution aimed to radically overthrow their government and 
so it required a large portion of the population. Accordingly, the articulated identity was 
simplified and all-encompassing. It invoked the ambiguous notion of “dignity” and called 
for undefined “democracy.” Looking back to Castells’ definition of a social movement, 
the Egyptian revolutions created an identity that could be understood both inside and 
outside the movement. While the nationalism and dignity were not identities that 
originated with the movement, the overarching identity of “Egyptians against Mubarak,” 
was created autonomously. Individuals within the movement were hidden by the unifying 
rhetoric. Nationalism and dignity were rallying cries to mobilize large swaths of the 
population, however they did not distinguish between the individual members. The Jan 
25 movement created a totalizing identity, meant to oppose the monolithic, dominating 
force of Mubarak’s regime. 
 
The Structure of a Revolution 
The popular media as well as academics were particularly enamored with the networked 
structure of the Jan 25 movement (Diani 2011, Vargas 2012, Anderson 2011). There were 
two forms of networks: those mediated through communication technologies and those 
based in communities. Analysts disagree about the degree to which each affected the 
movement, but there instead of attempting to choose which was the prime instigator of 
the revolution, it is more fruitful to see how these seemingly inconsonant networks 
coalesced against Mubarak. Social media played a key role in mobilizing the people and 
creating a sense of security and unity, but it was not solely responsible for creating the 
networks of protest. Castells’ network society thesis, is therefore given more strength 
because it describes a structure of protest that exists independently of technological tools.  
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Srinivasan (2011) argues that despite the novelty of digital activism, preexisting, non-
media networks were the more powerful narrative. These are familiar social groups, “[i]n 
Egypt, these networks may include family connections, neighborhoods, mosques and 
historical institutions such as the previously banned Muslim Brotherhood. New 
technologies hardly erode or overwhelm these classic models of communication and 
information sharing” Anderson (2011) adds to this point, saying that Egypt has culture of 
“deep communal bonds and trust,” which she believed allowed the movements to sustain 
their discipline, remain nonviolent and to organize without any centralized leadership (5). 
As a case in point, Anderson notes that when the police disengaged on orders from 
Mubarak in an attempt to create chaos, the citizens came together to maintain order. 
 
Beyond cultural groups, more traditional social movement actors like political activists 
and labor unions played an important role. Members of aforementioned political 
organizations—The Muslim Brotherhood, Kefaya movement, April 6 movement and 
Ayman Nour’s party—all eventually joined, though some did with hesitation. The 
inclusion of these an established collective action organization gave the Jan 25 movement 
an air of legitimacy. Many of these groups did not use social media to organize but relied 
on their pre-established networks because, Khamis and Vaughn (2011) explain, many of 
the members were not Internet users and instead followed their preexisting “institutional 
traditions” which were partially fueled by fears of Internet surveillance (12). Traditional 
political actors were instrumental in sustaining the protests, contributing their experience 
and also garnering support from larger parts of the population.  
 
Cultural and political networks are often overshadowed by the role of social media used 
by the aforementioned young, liberal middle class. Many have pointed out that 
communication technologies often aide social movements and social media is only the 
most recent incarnation of this phenomenon (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 28; Cottle, 2011, 
651). As Williamson (2011) explains, each medium performs a different role: “Alongside 
traditional activism and action, the tools of the trade today are the internet (for 
information dissemination and news), social media (to connect and coordinate), mobile 
phones (to capture what happens) and digital, particularly satellite, television to report it.” 
New social media allows the movements to circumvent censorship and the state-run 
media. Its rapid dissemination and ubiquity on mobile devices allowed protesters to 
quickly shift tactics (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 12). However, Diani (2011) finds that 
social media’s most substantial impact was by strengthening ties of solidarity in dispersed 
middle class (3). Social media’s greatest contribution was not in convincing the 
population that Mubarak needed to leave, this was already an unspoken consensus. 
Rather, social media uncovered and connected potential dissidents in middle class 
Egyptian society and then facilitated communication with one another. Once that class 
was mobilized, social media gave the Jan 25 movement more flexibility to evade the 
regime. Castells noted that the network structure is more adept than hierarchies at 
responding and reforming rapidly according to changes in their environment. As the 
protests continued, this strength of the adaptability of networks became apparent. 
 
The interplay between social media networks and physical protest networks is best 
highlighted when the regime cut the Internet for almost a week, beginning on January 
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28th, three days into the protests. Previously, as Cottle notes, social media also was used 
by the regime, from organizing pro-government rallies, creating dummy rallies in order to 
attract and then detain supporters, and even monitoring (Cottle, 2011 652). During the 
Internet black-out, activists used innovative analog technologies to communicate, using 
mobile phones, fax machines, dial-up modems, even ham radios (Khamis and Vaughn 
2011, 14). Adel Iskander, an expert on Arab media, argues that the plan actually 
backfired because the Egyptian people’s “reaction was strong…they became more 
resilient and more determined, because they refused the government’s attempt to 
‘infantilize’ them. Their message to the regime was ‘Egypt can’t be blocked and its 
people can’t be unplugged.’ ” (2011, qtd in Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 23). Rather than 
watching the protests unfold through their computer screens, people went to Tahrir 
Square, partially to protect from a massacre but also to protest. Even after the Internet 
was put back online, Tahrir Square became the epicenter of the movement. This moment 
demonstrated the limits of real virtuality and that in the Egyptian revolution the protest 
had to go beyond the screen to incorporate physical, social networks.  
 
However, while real virtuality met its limits within Egypt, the broadcast of images of 
protest continued to hold importance in the rest of the world. One famous example during 
the Internet shutdown, Google and Twitter created “Speak-2-Tweet,” a service that 
allowed users to post and listen to Twitter messages for news. There was a reciprocal 
relationship between the protesters and the international community that Khamis and 
Vaughn describe, “Egyptian activists were supported by the flow of information coming 
to them from abroad, while simultaneously influencing international public opinion 
abroad” (15). The movement tapped into international networks to take advantage of 
resources beyond their borders. In this aspect real virtuality was key in strengthening 
bonds between international networks. 
 
In Egypt, many networks overlapped to create a revolution against Mubarak. It extends 
from political groups, community organizations, Internet activists, street protesters and 
finally to an international community. They collectively identified as being against 
Mubarak, despite ideological differences. As Castells says, the main weakness of the 
network is the difficulty of coordinating towards a common goal, however, 
communication technology allows the network to be at once “centralized and 
decentralized. It can be co-ordinated without a center” (Stadler 2006, 185). While social 
media was initially used to organize the Jan 25 movement, the escalation of the protests 
during the Internet blackout demonstrates that the movement created a larger, more 
inclusive network of activists united against the regime.  
 
Evaluating the Network Society: the January 25th Movement 
The structural openings, oppositional identity and overlapping networks of the Jan 25 
movement together demonstrate that Castells’ conception of a network society 
successfully describes the workings this particular social movement. The structural 
openings that created the Egyptian revolution can be summarily described as erosion in 
the regime’s legitimacy coupled with an increase in demands as well as empowerment of 
the population. In Egypt, the global financial crisis, failed economic liberalism and the 
dissemination of western values through the media contributed to popular discontent. 
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Additionally, the availability of technology to the mainly middle class segment of 
Egyptian society acted as an incubator for their dissatisfaction and later mobilization. 
During that period, an oppositional identity emerged that unified the Egyptian people 
under the banners of nationalism and dignity. This identity was powerful in earning the 
support of the masses, however it did obscure individual demands. This logic extends to 
the structure of the movement as well—networks from all parts of society joined together 
towards a common goal, ignoring internal differences. While Castells creates a 
framework that synthesizes how a network structure and oppositional identity form a 
social movement that takes advantage of structural openings to enact social change, it 
does not successfully explain the relationship between the object of protest and the role of 
the individual within the movement.  
 
Castells’ shortcomings stem from an oversimplification of power. As previously 
explained, Castells uses a model of in/ex power that sees power as only the providence of 
members of networks. However, this fails to explain why the particular desires of an 
individual Egyptian protester are erased under a totalizing identity of being anti-Mubarak. 
The Jan 25 movement was composed of democrats, Islamists and radicals alike, each with 
very different conceptions of an ideal Egypt after Mubarak. However, these incompatible 
ideologies could be united to oppose Mubarak because their particular “logics” did not 
actually hold any power within their society. It means nothing to be a democrat or a 
political Islamist in an autocratic regime because both are dominated. Conversely, the 
network of the Jan 25 movement depends upon the existence of Mubarak for their own 
existence. The ex/in power that Castells describes is only capable of explaining how these 
disparate actors related to each other, but it does not look at how the overarching power 
structure compelled them to unite.  
 
Power in Egypt came from one source—Mubarak’s regime. As Brumberg’s liberalized 
autocracy explains, any opposition that was allowed under Mubarak was used to create 
enough dissonance within society to cement the regime as the default, central, power-
holder. Foucault would describe this relationship as domination because there was no 
possibility of resistance. Egyptians were not “free subjects” because they were incapable 
of resisting the regime in any meaningful way. Nash (2001) explains that “[p]ower is in 
operation wherever there are relations involving human beings with real alternative 
choices of action” (241). Since power is moving in only a downward direction, to 
challenge it, those that are dominated must collectively resist it in the opposite direction.  
 
The totalizing identity and tactics of the Jan 25 movement were necessary to fully 
challenge the domination of the regime. As Foucault (1982) explains, both the 
domination of a group and the accompanying resistance and revolts are characterized by 
how they “manifest in a massive and universalizing form, at the level of a the whole 
social body, the locking together of power relations with relations of strategy and the 
results proceeding from their interactions” (795). The order of magnitude between the 
totalizing identity and an autocratic regime is not accidental, the Jan 25 movement 
needed to join together to create a unified block of resistance which would later create 
space for individual resistance. The aim of the Jan 25 movement was essentially to 
become free subjects. The in/ex power of Castells would only explain individual 
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participants aspirations as ways to gain power in an “alternate network” when the 
network of the Jan 25 movement is only a means to an end—freedom. While Castells 
elucidates the mechanics of a networked social movement, his analysis fails to recognize 
that the essential reason for the movement’s existence is freedom. 
 
Case Study: Occupy Wall Street 
OWS3 came into physical being in New York City’s Zuccotti Park on September 17th, 
when a thousand protesters congregated and three hundred set up a semi-permanent camp 
(Schwartz 2011). Two months later, the Occupy Movement spread to 826 cities in the 
United States, including both major metropolises and small rural towns, and had a 
presence in 352 cities across the globe (Saunders 2011). The Occupy movement came at 
the tail end of the other global protests, and the movement explicitly mirrored other 
movements. However this was a reciprocal form of contagion, while previous movements 
inspired the Occupy movement, it was the first one to spread its specific brand name to 
globally. OWS centered around two fundamental ideas: first, that the United States 
political economic system is broken; second, that another world is possible through a 
quasi-anarchist form of organization (Schwartz 2011). “Occupation” became shorthand 
for encampments of protesters, and their form became, in the words of Jones and Dean “a 
new form of political representation.” (2012, 1). Their slogan “We are the 99%” was the 
only unifying factor, the Occupy movement as a whole rejected the possibility of 
consolidating demands and instead let each individual encampment, even each individual 
protester, represent themselves. Through a study of the structural openings that allowed 
OWS to gain attention, the fragmented identities of the movement and finally diffuse 
network it employed, it will become clear that a fundamentally different power structure 
allowed this movement to develop. 
 
Openings for Occupation 
For their July issue, Adbusters magazine put together a simple poster of a ballerina atop 
the Wall Street bull with riot police in the background. There was only one line of text: 
#Occupy Wall Street. This image is typical of Adbusters— a subversive message, 
imagery of global revolution and a call to action. While the issues of political 
representation and economic injustice that galvanized the OWS movement cannot be 
underestimated, these economic and political realities were tools for preexising group of 
the so-called Millenial activists. A radical faction of this generation were inspired by a 
political philosophy that rejected representation and attempted to make horizontalism a 
political form. With the help of sympathetic political thinkers and their congenital 
technology skills, these activists were able to orchestrate a full movement that spread 
beyond their ranks. 
 
The common explanation of the Occupy movement holds social inequalities responsible 
for its creation. A Vanity Fair article reflected on the movement in February 2012, saying 
“[t]he amazing thing about Occupy Wall Street is not that it started—America was full of 
                                                        
3 For the sake of clarity, I will use the term Occupy Wall Street to refer specifically to the 
New York City based movement, and the term Occupy movement to refer to the resulting 
global social movement.  
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fed-up people at the end of 2011—but that it worked” (Chafkin 2012, 74-75). By 
September 2011, the United States unemployment rate had hovered between 10 and 9% 
for two full years (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). The Supreme Court’s unpopular 
Citizens United decision bestowed corporations with legal personhood, allowing 
undisclosed unlimited political campaign contributions. Finally, over the summer the 
United States Congress bickered over the nation’s budget leading to a near Treasury 
default. With all of these events together, the country was disenchanted with the 
relentless pursuit of profit. The sentiment was articulated in Joseph Stiglitz’s May 2011 
Vanity Fair article “Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%” examined economic stratification 
and the undue influence elites exert over the political process This article is rumored to 
be the root of the slogan “We are the 99%.” However, this narrative of OWS as a product 
of social frustration overlooks the movement’s innovative form of protest and the extent 
to which it is consciously created by a new generation of activists. 
 
The Millenial generation’s form of activism is highly personalized, technology-dependent 
and located within the world of real virtuality. Kristin Ivie, from the progressive website 
Social Citizens, explains that the generation balances between two extremes—effective 
activism 2.0 and “slackavism” (2009). Activism 2.0 shifts social change from large-scale 
one-time campaigns to making it a daily exercise through  “small, practical acts - and, 
often, clicks” (Ivie 2009). “Slackavism,” on the other hand, was coined by Evegny 
Morozov, a vocal skeptic of digital democracy, to describe “feel-good online activism 
that has zero political or social impact,” citing online petitions and “liking” a cause on 
Facebook. He questions whether the organizational effort put into such campaigns could 
be better spent using more conventional methods of activism (Morozov 2009) Micah 
White, chief editor of Adbusters, wrote an opinion piece in The Guardian in 2010 
denouncing “clicktivism” and instead called for digital activists to “jettison the 
consumerist ideology of marketing that has for too long constrained the possibility of 
social revolution” (White 2010). Millenial activists engage in the process of producing 
culture through real virtuality by creating turning causes into symbols, whether it be a 
page on Facebook, a Youtube video or a Kickstarter campaign, with the intention of 
raising funds and awareness. However, their critics question whether these tactics can 
truly create social change. In both their effective and unsuccessful incarnations, the 
Millenial activists disseminate their causes through communication technology with a 
focus on individual participation.  
 
The mobilization of Millenial activists into a large, sustained protest was inspired by the 
protests that erupted across the globe against seemingly similar forces of oppression and 
successful oppositional tactics. The Indignados movement in Spain camped in over 60 
public squares calling for economic democracy, political justice and peace. Jeffery Sach, 
an economics professor publically speculated, “[d]on’t be so sure it can’t happen here. 
Because the precursors—of inequality, a sense of injustice—apply to the U.S.” (Chafkin 
2012, 75). Just as contagion affected the Middle East, America activists felt that it was 
their moment to do something. Exactly what they did was informed by a growing 
adherence among activists to a philosophy of protest that employs local networks to 
empower individual action rather than create a unified representative body.   
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Dean and Jones (2012) describe the theory that drives the Occupy movement, deeming it 
a new form of political participation that empowers the individual. Jones and Dean 
explain that representation is seen as “unavoidably hierarchical, distancing and repressive” 
qualities that are antithetical to the movement. They cite Hardt and Negri, who explain 
Occupy is not fighting for inclusion in traditional avenues of political participation and 
instead are building their own form of representation (2). David Graeber, a British 
anthropologist who was instrumental in shaping Occupy’s anarchist decision-making 
body, highlights the importance of prefigurative politics in which protesters attempt to 
create the world as they hope it to be (2). Finally, OWS rejects representation of others, 
which Dean and Jones explain is includes both representation within group decisions and 
collectively representing the movement: “To speak for another, it is claimed, effects a 
kind of violence or exclusion, repressing individual autonomy…[and] any attempt to 
represent the movement would necessarily restrict, judge and negate it, reducing its 
potential to the already given terms and expectations of the dominant system” (2). This 
philosophy becomes the basis for the vehement horizontalism structure of the movement, 
which is complementary to the highly individualized tactics of the Millenial generation.  
 
The main structural openings that enabled OWS mirror those that empower the Jan 25 
movement—the simultaneous crumbling of institutions and the rise of a new group of 
activists—yet the details speak to the fact that the United States has a long tradition of 
competitive, participatory democracy. The United States, despite some radicals’ claims to 
the contrary, is not a liberalized autocracy. The economic and political crisis greatly 
exacerbated preexisting inequalities in the United States, however individuals within the 
movement did have established paths of recourse in the political system. As for the 
Millenial generation of activists, they differ from earlier protesters because their social 
change is enacted on a symbolic yet highly individualized level mainly taking place in the 
sphere of real virtuality. This type of activism is only possible with the free flow of 
information without undue censorship. In this environment, a philosophy of protest that 
rejects representation and expresses its beliefs through action is a form of resisting the 
status quo of a representative democracy. 
 
Creating an Oppositional Identity of the 99% 
A week and a half into the setting up camp in Zuccotti Park, the General Assembly of 
New York City released the “Declaration of the Occupation,” a long unwieldy list of 
demands blaming corporations for almost every social and economic ill in America. It 
ended with their solution: “Exercise your right to peaceably assemble; occupy public 
space; create a process to address the problems we face; and generate solutions accessible 
to everyone” (Schwartz 2011). The movement as a whole did not adopt these nor any 
other list of demands, however they did use the New York Assembly’s solution. By not 
codifying demands, OWS is able to encompass every individual identity. Members were 
galvanized by the way the movement opposed elites with their slogan “We are the 99%,” 
but even this phrase was used to distinguish each individual’s story. The identity did not 
oppose a single entity but instead the Occupy movement denounced the American 
capitalist and democratic system. 
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The one unifying slogan of OWS is the phrase “We are the 99%. ” It creates an identity 
that is once all-inclusive but also deeply individual. The digital Tumblr “We are the 99%” 
is an aggregation of people’s stories of economic mishaps and social disenfranchisement. 
The format is the same: a self-portrait of a person with their face hidden behind a 
handwritten or typed sheet of paper telling their story. The effect is almost overwhelming 
as the viewer sees endless, yet unique permutations of dispossession. The slogan in itself, 
however, implies the membership of almost every person in the world. It is a far cry from 
“Down with Mubarak,” because it doesn’t name a common enemy instead it asserts the 
membership of all. In this use, real virtuality can subvert overarching systems because by 
articulating their stories in a mediated reality, the powerless becoming empowered. “We 
are the 99%” brings attention to the various ways the entire political economic system 
acts oppressively.  
 
The refusal to tabulate demands allows the Occupy movement to fully resist oppressive 
institutions and instead transfer attention to action. In an interview, Graeber explained not 
having demands avoided cooptation by the institutions that cause the systematic problems, 
“it’s a way of juxtaposing yourself against these powerful, undemocratic forces you’re 
protesting. If you make demands, you’re saying, in a way, that you’re asking the people 
in power and the existing institutions to do something different” (Klein 2011). Instead, 
OWS proved to their participants that it is possible to function outside of the oppressive 
system. As Stoller observed, the camps offer as a “church of dissent…a group of people, 
gathered together, to create a public space seeking meaning in their culture…There’s a 
deep fear of official spokespeople beginning to monopolize and misinterpret the non-
hierarchical model of community protest” (Stoller 2011). By rejecting demands and 
instead focusing on action, the movement created an identity that opposed institutions 
and relied on individual’s creation of meaning. 
 
OWS’s identity was defined by what it was not—the 1%. This is all-inclusive but also a 
completely negative construction of identity. Instead of relying on a common, articulated 
group of demands, the movement defined its own meaning through action. The choice to 
not have demands was intentional, another of Castells’ hallmarks for social movements. 
In a sense, OWS’s identity was formed in the realm of theory and then put into practice. 
The anti-representation philosophy means no overall identity exists; each individual 
group, even individual participant, prioritizes his or her own demands. The construction 
of identity in OWS is fluid to the extreme giving individuals equal power in the 
organization. The movement forced itself to be interpreted through its action rather than 
attempt to create a totalizing identity. Resistance for OWS is highly individualized, just 
as oppression from the larger political economic system is an individual experience. 
 
The Structure of the Occupy Movement 
The structure of OWS exemplifies the dynamic between the individual and overall 
movement. In Zuccotti Park, decision-making was done by the General Assembly, which 
Schneider succinctly describes: “[g]et ready for jargon: the General Assembly is a 
horizontal, autonomous, leaderless, modified-consensus-based system with roots in 
anarchist thought” (2011). There are no hierarchies of decision-making. Each individual, 
theoretically, has the same amount of power as the others. From its macro-organization to 
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the structure within specific encampments, the movement deliberately operates as a 
spread-out network to create a new political form. 
 
The operation of individual encampments demonstrates the extent and limits of anti-
representational horizontalism as a political form. Each OWS group makes decisions 
through the General Assembly (GA), an open congregation of every participant, which 
operates according to the principle that every individual has equal power and no one 
person may represent another. To communicate in large groups, protesters used a 
“people’s mike” system creating a rippling echo to amplify the individual speakers 
(Schwartz 2011). As Schwartz (2011) explains, “In the same way that poker ritualizes 
capitalism and North Korea’s mass games ritualize totalitarianism, the people’s mike 
ritualizes horizontalism” (2011). Any individual may make a proposal but any other 
person may “block” it if they disagree with it so fundamentally that if it passed they 
would leave the group. A block requires the person who proposed the measure to defend 
it again and the measure will only be passed if 90 percent of the GA decides to allow it. 
This gives an inordinate amount of power to the radical fringes of the movement while 
preserving the integrity of the movement’s principles. However, in practice some of these 
ideals are upset. For example, The New Yorker reported that Marisa Holmes is an 
unofficial leader of the New York GA. She proposed instituting a Spokes Council with 
limited day-to-day authority which eventually was approved after much debate (Schwartz 
2011). As with any political form, horizontalism encounters its limits when put into 
practice. 
 
In most Occupy Encampments, working groups partially act as public utilities services 
and as voices for the movement—health, food, legal, sanitation and public relations are 
common groups in encampments. In New York City alone, however, there are 89 
working groups, which range from the practical to radical to recreational, including 
Alternative Currencies (171 members), Occupy Farms (109 members), Meditation (150 
members), Translation (92 members), Immigrant Worker Justice (70 members) and 
Medics (110 members) (“New York General Assembly, #Occupy Wall Street”). Each of 
these groups has an online presence, but it is unclear how many are active as of May 
2012. The proliferation and diversity of working groups demonstrates the degree of 
agency individuals are given within OWS, anyone with initiative may create their own 
working group.  
 
Beyond the structure of individual movements, technology plays a key role in allowing 
the movements to coordinate with each other and share tactics. The hashtag 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET was first used by Adbusters’ iconic poster in August, but lay 
dormant until the protesters took to Zuccotti Park. Trendistic, a company which tracks 
hashtags on Twitter, found that in the twenty-four hours after the first occupation, the 
movement was nearly one of every five hundred hash tags, a statistic that remained true a 
month later (Berkowitz 2011). The movement also created its own centers of 
communication. The live-streaming video website Global Revolution was established on 
September 17th and continues to act as a documentarian and newscaster of the Occupy 
movements across the globe. Occupy actively creates their own symbols within the 
culture of real virtuality using social media and other Internet tools. As Castells suggests, 
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technology enables the network’s flexibility by letting the groups communicate with each 
other. Schwartz observes this is part of a zeitgeist, “horizontalism seems made for this 
moment. It relies on people forming loose connections quickly—something that modern 
technology excels at” (2011). Social media brought together activists together, creating 
international networks that abscribed to the Occupy identity.  
 
Including creating publicity about the movement, there is a dizzying amount of websites 
that act as instruction manuals: OccupyWallStreet.com, OccupyWallStreet.org, 
TaketheSquare.net, Adbusters’ Occupy website, as well as the Facebook pages for each 
individual city. Their  “How To” sections usually link to HowToOccupy.org, a free, open 
database to “promote and spread the methods, techniques and knowledge about peaceful 
occupation of public spaces while living based upon participatory democracy.” It 
includes sections on camping, cooking, first aid, non-violent demonstration, legal 
resources, communication and squatting. The largest section is “Building a New World,” 
where groups with self-explanatory names such as “Wikiparliament,” “Basic Income 
Earth Network,” “Seeds for Change” and “Open Library” are given short blurbs and links 
to their sites. The website serves as both as a clearinghouse for alternative ways of life 
but also as a tutorial for protest. The movement spread globally through the Internet, but 
with the intention of empowering people internationally to take part in real-world 
activism. 
 
For OWS, the network structure was not chosen to escape censorship but instead as a 
political act. Networks formed around ideas, such as the working groups, rather than out 
of necessity or accident as with the Jan 25 movement. Furthermore, while individual 
networks were all interrelated, they were not united under a totalizing demand. Instead, 
the network was a form of prefigurative politics as it equalized power between each 
member of OWS throughout the decision-making process. The online Occupy movement 
also forged networks through social media with the intention of creating physical 
manifestations of their particular philosophy across the globe. In both the macro- and 
micro- structure of Occupy, the network is a deliberate, political structure that aims to 
empower the individual. 
 
Evaluating the Network Society: Occupy Wall Street 
As with the Jan 25 movement, Castells’ network society thesis explains the mechanics of 
the OWS movement as a decentralized movement articulating an oppositional identity. 
The movement was born out of a crisis of the political and economic institutions, which 
Occupy broadly condemned, citing vast inequalities in America, the corruption within the 
political system and a general disapprobation of the judicial system. Furthermore, the 
Millenial generation were poised to use real virtuality as platform to spread the message 
of discontent. International revolutionaries served as inspiration that a leaderless 
movement was a sustainable form of protest. A anti-representational philosophy 
influenced the movement to create a new horizontal form of political participation. This 
translated into an outright rejection of demands which allowed each individual protester 
to express their own grievances. “The 99%” took on as many meanings as there were 
individuals to articulate them, an extreme example of Castells’ idea that a single 
movement can articulate many meanings, depending upon audience. Absent of stated 
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demands, the movement’s actions became their message. The structure of each 
encampment further empowered the individual by equalizing decision-making power 
among every participant. Each camp became a microcosm of an alternative world made 
up of working groups and General Assemblies. In Castells’ framework, OWS is a social 
movement that intentionally challenges the political-economy by expressing a broad 
oppositional identity through a politicized network structure.  
 
This synopsis, however, fails to explain a key difference between OWS and the Jan 25 
movement that stem from their distinct overarching relations of power. The individual 
protester in OWS represents himself or herself autonomously, there is no totalizing 
identity like the anti-Mubarak identity. The only overarching identity of the Occupy 
movement is opposition to the political economic system seen as oppressing them, there 
is no specified demand. Foucault explains that to be subjugated one must at once be 
controlled by another but also be aware of one’s own identity. The OWS protesters were 
no doubt “free subjects” according to Foucault—their self-representation of their 
grievances attest to that fact. Domination is unilateral control, while power can only be 
exercised on free subject capable of resisting such as the OWS protester.  
 
Subjugation is a complex power structure that allows some resistance. Power does not 
flow downwards, as it does under a dictatorship, instead subjugation can happen 
simultaneously at different levels. Familiar forms of subjugation include racism, sexism 
and classism. Each individual simultaneously experiences privileges or restrictions 
depending on how they are perceived by others. OWS individualized attempting to 
encompass every variation of oppression. By refusing to name their demands Occupy 
indicted the system at large allowing resistance to flow in all directions. The prefigurative 
politics of the OWS movement is actually a form of liberation from subjugation. The 
fragmented identity and politicized network were both ways to directly challenge the 
political economic system that controlled the people. The network structure acted as a 
“relation of strategy” because by incorporating all individuals without favoring one over 
another it acted as the converse to a political economic system that subjugated everyone 
except the elites. Whereas the Jan 25 movement’s essential aim was to achieve freedom 
and gain the possibility of resistance, the OWS movement was attempting to create a new 
way to resist that subverts the oppressive political economic system.  
 
Conclusions: Power in a Network Society 
Manuel Castells’ theory of the network society make intelligible a wide-array of disparate 
phenomena that can include a global economic crisis, Facebook revolutions and 
leaderless encampments of politically minded squatters, quite an accomplishment for a 
triology that was published in 1998. His theory elucidates the specific operation of the 
network as a political, social, economic and cultural form. He explains how information 
technology has contributed to a world in which individuals may be coordinated without a 
central decision-maker or heirarchy. The network becomes a superior form of 
organization because it is flexible, adaptable and capable of endless expansion. His 
conception of space and time as being a “space of flows” and “timeless time,” describes 
the accelerated yet fragmented rhythms of life and the ethereal nature of power no longer 
bound by geography. Power is binary; one is either included or excluded, determining 
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relations of power according to each network’s particular logic. Within this increasingly 
discordant world, social movements are seen as the only source of social change.  
 
As the world shifts to a social morphology of the network, institutions are put into crisis, 
creating many of the structural openings that surrounded both OWS and the Jan 25 
movement, manifested in diverse events such as the global financial crisis, rising 
inequality in the United States and the infiltration of democracy in autocratic states. “Real 
virtuality,” in which reality is a mediated experience that exists on the screens, becomes 
the principle source of meaning. Activists in both Egypt and the United States took a hold 
of this new space to establish a virtual civil society free of censorship in order to express 
subversive ideas that spread globally along channels of social and mass media.The two 
movements expressed latent oppositional identities that denounced each movement’s 
respective political-economic system. These identities were reified in the movements’ 
“decentralized,” “horizontal,” and simply put, “leaderless” structure. As applied to the 
two case studies, Castells’ theory explains the workings of a networked social movement 
while contextualizing it in a larger theory of a changing social structure. 
 
Despite Castells’ successes in describing both the structural openings as well as the 
advantages of using a network, his conception of power simplifies the role of the 
overarching power structure on the formation of movements’ identity. Identity in social 
movements, as previously stated, is a recursive interaction between the individual 
participant who ascribes to that identity as well as the object of contention, which 
prompts the creation of that identity. In the case of the Jan 25 movement, Egyptian 
citizens associated themselves with nationalism and dignity, but they were compelled to 
exert that identity to coalesce against Mubarak’s despotic regime. Similarly, the OWS 
participants united under the “We are the 99%” banner because they felt oppressed by the 
political-economic system. However, the object of contention in Egypt and OWS were 
categorically different. Egypt under Mubarak was an autocratic society completely 
dominated its citizens. In comparison, the OWS protesters as citizens in a competitive 
democracy were “free subjects” capable of resistance. Their protest was not against being 
dominated, but instead an attempt to create a new form of political participation.  
 
This observation has ramifications in the function of the network in the two movements. 
In Egypt, the network was a means to an end—democracy. In contrast, OWS’s network 
became politicized. The General Assembly and the encampments were a form of 
prefigurative politics that suggested anti-representational, horizontal political 
participation was not only ideal but also a viable possibility. Foucault explains that 
“relations of strategy” change depending on the type of power relations so that there is a 
degree of similarity in the way power is exerted but also resisted. The network that the 
Jan 25 movement used was composed of all facets of Egyptian society and directed 
toward a dominating force. OWS was also an all-inclusive network, however by rejecting 
any representation, the resistance took on a diasporic, individualized form mirroring 
diffuse systemic oppression.  
 
At the time of this writing in May 2012, both of these movements are still developing—
Egypt will soon hold presidential elections and OWS just mounted their May 1st 
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resurgence campaign. As the movements progress, Castells and Foucault can be 
instrumental in guiding questions for further inquiry to fully understand the interplay 
between power and networks. What is the true potential of the network as a political 
form? In Egypt, will the networked revolution prove capable of changing an autocratic 
regime to a fully democratic one? Or, will a new dictator simply replace Mubarak in 
these upcoming elections? In the greater Occupy movement, can a politicized network be 
a viable alternative to the larger political economic system? Have the protesters 
discovered a successful “relation of strategy” to oppose the subjugation of the American 
capitalist democratic system? The answers to these questions will enrich our 
understanding of methods of resistance in shifting political economic systems.     
